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The Grounds of Critique 
 
On the Concept of Human Dignity in Social Orders of Justification 
 
 
von Rainer Forst 
 
1. Ernst Bloch pointed out in a particularly emphatic way that the concept of human 
dignity featured centrally in historical struggles against different forms of unjustified 
rule, i.e. domination – to which one must add that it continues to do so to the present 
day. The “upright gait,” putting an end to humiliation and insult: this is the most 
powerful demand, in both political and rhetorical terms, that a “human rights-based” 
claim expresses. It marks the emergence of a radical, context-transcending reference 
point immanent to social conflicts which raises fundamental questions concerning the 
customary opposition between immanent and transcendent criticism. For within the 
idiom of demanding respect for human dignity, a right is invoked “here and now,” in a 
particular, context-specific form, which at its core is owed to every human being as a 
person. Thus Bloch is in one respect correct when he asserts that human rights are 
not a natural “birthright” but must be achieved through struggle;
1 but in another 
respect this struggle can develop its social power only if it has a firm and in a certain 
sense “absolute” normative anchor. Properly understood, it becomes apparent that 
these social conflicts always affect “two worlds”: the social reality, on the one hand, 
which is criticized in part or radically in the light of an ideal normative dimension, on 
the other. For those who engage in this criticism there is no doubt that the normative 
dimension is no less real than the reality to which they refuse to resign themselves. 
Those who critically transcend reality always also live elsewhere.
2
  From the perspective of social philosophy, there is an asymmetrical relation 
between the rich possibilities of demonstrating various forms of “degradation”
 
3
                                                            
1 Ernst Bloch, Naturrecht und menschliche Würde, Frankfurt am Main 1977, p. 215. 
 and 
the philosophical problem of justifying that in which the essential claim to dignity is 
anchored. Human beings are supposed to be “inviolable” in their dignity. But what 
does this mean and where does this special status come from? Contrary to the view 
2 On the issue of utopia that plays a role here, see Rainer Forst, “Utopie und Ironie. Zur Normativität der 
politischen Philosophie des “Nirgendwo”,” in G. Abel (Hg.), Kreativität. 20. Deutscher Kongress für 
Philosophie, Hamburg 2006. 
3 See Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society, Cambridge, Mass. 1996; Axel Honneth, The Struggle for 
Recognition, Cambridge 1996; idem, Unsichtbarkeit, Frankfurt am Main 2003.   
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that any answer to this question must rely on a transcendent, religious justification,
4 
in the following brief remarks I will make a plea for a historically reconstructed,
5 yet 
context-transcending normative understanding of the person as the basis of 
fundamental moral claims and as the “ground of critique” of social norms. This 
involves a notion of the person as a justifying being, as a being who uses and 
“needs” justifications in order to lead a life “fit for human beings” among her fellows. 
Recognizing this dignity means seeing persons as beings who are endowed with a 
right to justification of all actions or norms that affect them in morally relevant ways – 
and acknowledging that every moral person has a duty to provide such justification. 
In a reflexive turn this right is to be seen as the most basic right because it is the 
presupposition for being able to orient oneself autonomously in social space as a 
“space of reasons.” This social existence means offering and demanding 
justifications, and hence being able to live in two or three worlds at the same time: 
the world of actual normative justifications and the world of normative justifications 
that must be regarded as correct or more correct (without assuming that normative 
justifications exist there in some Platonic sense), where the world of criticism and 
controversy forms the connecting link between these two worlds. To understand 
societies as orders of justification in this sense is not to imply that they do not contain 
complex and plural contexts and narratives of justification, but it does mean that 
basic claims exist which point beyond these contexts and call for a new order. To 
conceive of ourselves as normatively independent within the space of reasons makes 
us into “critical” beings who never comply with just one given order of justification.
6
 
 
2. Let me begin with some remarks on the phenomenology of dignity. In contrast to 
the dignity of a craftsman, who regards it as “beneath his dignity” to perform or be 
required to perform substandard work, “human dignity” signifies a status that applies 
                                                            
4 For example,  Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, Cambridge 2002; Tine Stein, Himmlische Quellen 
und irdisches Recht, Frankfurt am Main 2007. 
5 I provide a reconstruction of the paths along which the concept of the person and his or her dignity developed, 
in the context of historical and normative conflicts, in conjunction with the issue of toleration in my study 
Toleration in Conflict, trans. Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge forthcoming, Part I. Demonstrating the historical context 
within which such concepts evolved is as important for understanding their conflictual character as the 
recognition that this does not amount to reducing them to historically relative concepts. 
6 For the idea of an order of justification (as employed in the Frankfurt research project on the “Formation of 
Normative Orders”: www.normativeorders.net) see Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther, „Die Herausbildung 
normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee eines interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms,” in: Rainer Forst and Klaus 
Günther (eds.), Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen, Frankfurt/Main 2011. For an analysis of “contexts of 
justification” see Rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2002.  
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to human beings as human beings, regardless of their specific identity. What, to put it 
in negative terms, constitutes the most serious violation of this dignity? Here people’s 
intuitions diverge and they propose such things as living in poverty, suffering social 
exclusion, or, even worse, being violated in one’s bodily integrity. And then it seems 
natural to assume that human dignity requires having the means that help to avoid 
poverty, exclusion, and mistreatment. The tendency is to think in terms of basic 
needs and to infer a substantive social condition that is supposed to make an 
“existence fit for a human being” possible. However, in concentrating in this way on 
the passive as opposed to the active component of human dignity something is 
overlooked. Living in poverty does not violate the dignity of a human being in all 
cases, such as in the wake of a natural catastrophe that plunges a community into an 
emergency situation. What violates people’s dignity in the first instance is that they 
have to live in poverty, that is that they are compelled to do so, in particular that they 
are compelled by other human beings who have caused this condition, or at least 
could remedy it but fail to do so, either because they simply ignore the claims of 
those affected or respond to them in an inadequate fashion. The violation of dignity 
consists in being ignored, not counting, being “invisible” for the purpose of 
legitimizing social relations. In issues concerning human dignity, therefore, one 
should not think in terms of the end, of (objective or subjective) conditions or states of 
affairs, but of social relations, of processes, interactions, and structures between 
persons, and of the status of individuals within them. This also explains why certain 
forms of poverty relief, such as mere charity on the part of those who otherwise 
ignore or even harm the poor, or bureaucratic measures that treat the “needy” in a 
condescending manner, are no less degrading than poverty itself.
7
  Thus the central phenomenon of the violation of dignity is not the lack of the 
necessary means to live a “life fit for a human being” but the conscious violation of 
the moral status of being a person who is owed justifications for existing relations or 
specific actions; it is the phenomenon of “invisibility” for the purposes of legitimation,
  
8
                                                            
7 On this see  Margalit, The Decent Society, ibid., chs. 13 and 14. 
 
of being subject to rule without adequate justification, and thus of being dominated. 
This can assume more or less drastic forms, ranging from social exclusion to physical 
torment. Structurally speaking, however, they remain the same at the core, namely 
that a person’s right to justification or, to be more precise, to reciprocal justification on 
8 This was given literary expression in Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, New York 1994.  
 
5 
 
a basis of equality, is negated. Being recognized in one’s dignity as a human being 
means, in general terms, not being ignored in questions that concern one in essential 
ways. 
 
3. This meaning of the concept is also shown by its history. The human being, to 
whom dignity is attributed, whether on the basis of inner fortitude, as in the Stoics,
9 or 
with reference to the status of a free citizen of the city, as in republicanism, has 
always been the individual who is not subject to unauthorized rule, i.e. domination. In 
other words, it is the human being who determines him or herself, whether personally 
or politically – in Cicero, paradigmatically both.
10
  The stress placed by Christian theology on the idea that all human beings can 
claim special regard in virtue of being created “in God’s image” first acquired its 
importance for human rights in a political context, namely in the conflicts in which 
people claimed their “divinely endowed” rights against tyrannical forms of 
domination.
 “Freedom from arbitrariness,” both 
in one’s actions and in how one is treated, is the original connotation of dignity. It 
means being able to act and being recognized as an entity endowed with equal rights 
and duties to justification. 
11
                                                            
9 Compare Seneca on the “truly noble man” and the treatment of slaves in Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius, Oxford 
1932, letters nos. 44 and 47. 
 Thus the notion that Christianity is historically (as well as normatively) 
the foundation of the conception of dignity that informs human rights is in need of 
correction. It first had to undergo extensive reinterpretation (drawing in large part on 
ancient thought) before the “human being” could emerge as an earthly being in her 
own right and as a person who can claim unconditional respect. For, traditionally, the 
chief concern of Christian pastoral care was exclusively with the soul, and not with 
the dignity of the human being as a free being. Neither Augustine nor Thomas was in 
any doubt that earthly death represents by far the lesser evil by comparison with the 
death of the soul. A new understanding of individuality had to emerge so that the 
10 Cicero, On Duties, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. T. Atkins, Cambridge 1991, I, 106 (pp. 41-2); idem, The Republic, 
in idem,  The Republic and the Laws, ed. J. Powell, Oxford 1998, II, 29. Philip Pettit takes up this idea 
underlying republicanism as an emancipatory indictment of domination: “The grievance I have in mind is that of 
having to live at the mercy of another, having to live in a manner that leaves you vulnerable to some ill that the 
other is in a position arbitrarily to impose; and this, in particular, when each of you is in a position to see that you 
are dominated by the other, in a position to see that you each see this, and so on.” Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A 
Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford 1997, pp. 4f. However, the guiding conception of freedom at work 
here cannot be adequately understood apart from that of dignity as a subject of justification, since it concerns 
freedom from arbitrary rule or domination. 
11 On the following see Forst, Toleration in Conflict, ibid., in particular chs. 3-6.  
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profane human being could appear as morally autonomous and respect-worthy “in 
itself.” “Self-determination without theo-teleological determination,” as a central 
normative idea, is an achievement that cannot be attributed to Christianity, even 
though Protestantism (and the idea of individual responsibility before God) played a 
certain (in turn ambivalent) role in this process. It is also important to keep in mind 
that the conflicts in which the natural law-based claim to freedom and dignity 
triumphed were to a large extent those which combated traditionally legitimized forms 
of political-religious rule and domination. In general, it was the “heretics” who 
discovered freedom.  
  From a systematic point of view, a religious justification of respect for human 
beings suffers from the defect that, on the one hand, it can be addressed in the full 
sense only to those who recognize the other as created in God’s image, and hence 
only to the devout, so that atheists, in particular, would not be able to comprehend 
why human rights have genuine validity.
12
  As already suggested, the general concept of human dignity is, by contrast, 
inextricably bound up with that of self-determination
 In addition to the limitation thus placed on 
the community of active respect, such a justification also potentially restricts the 
community of those to be respected, for it seems to be an open question whether 
and why, for instance, the persistent repudiation and undermining of the foundation 
of morality and law by atheists should be tolerated. Therefore, a religiously founded 
attribution of human rights, even if it works with universalistic concepts, cannot 
redeem the universalistic claim that these rights make to be strictly binding across 
religious boundaries.  
13 in a creative and 
simultaneously moral sense that already involves a political component. At stake is 
one’s status of not being subject to external forces which have not been legitimized 
to rule over a person – in other words, being respected in one’s autonomy as an 
independent being.
14
                                                            
12 For a clear statement of this position see Robert Spaemann, “Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde,” in E.-W. 
Böckenförde and R. Spaemann (eds.), Menschenrechte und Menschenwürde, Stuttgart 1987, pp. 295-313, here p. 
313. Spaemann defends the view that “atheism definitively robs the idea of human dignity of its justification.” 
 Kant captured this idea in terms of the “worthiness of every 
13 Thus Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man (1486), ed. and trans. C. G. Wallis & P. J. W. Miller, 
Indianapolis, 1998, p. 4, represents God as addressing human beings: “In conformity with thy free judgement, in 
whose hands I have placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself.” 
14 On the political component see, in particular, Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Duty of Man and Citizen 
According to Natural Law, ed. J. Tully, Cambridge 1991, p. 61: “Man is an animal which is not only intensely 
interested in its own preservation but also possesses a native and delicate sense of its own value. To detract from 
that causes no less alarm than harm to body or goods. In the very name of man a certain dignity is felt to lie, so 
that the ultimate and most effective rebuttal of insolence and insults from others is ‘Look, I am not a dog, but a 
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rational subject to be a law-giving member in the kingdom of ends.”
15
 
 To be such a 
law-giving member means not being disregarded when it comes to legitimizing social 
rule, and knowing that one should not disregard others in this respect either, that one 
is subject to the law oneself. This conception of dignity, and correspondingly respect 
for others as “ends in themselves”, means that humans must be regarded as beings 
who have an unconditional right to justification, a basic right on which all other basic 
rights are founded. To possess human dignity means being an equal member in the 
realm of subjects and authorities of justification, an attribute, I should add, that does 
not depend on the active exercise of the capacity of justification, which would exclude 
infants or disabled persons; correspondingly, to act with dignity means being able to 
justify oneself to others; to be treated in accordance with this dignity means being 
respected as such an equal member; to renounce one’s dignity means no longer 
regarding oneself as such a member but as inferior; to treat others in ways which 
violate their dignity means regarding them as lacking any justification authority. 
4. Some clarifications of the concept of justification may be appropriate at this point.
16
                                                                                                                                                                                     
man as well as yourself’.” From this Pufendorf derives principles of equal respect and reciprocal justifiability of 
claims to justice: “Hence this too is among the common duties of natural law, that no one require for himself 
more than he allows others, unless he has acquired some special right to do so, but allow others to enjoy their 
own right equally with him” (p. 62).  
 
When it comes to justifying morally relevant actions in a social context, the decisive 
criteria are reciprocity and generality, since such actions must be justified by appeal 
to norms which can claim to hold in a reciprocal and general fashion. If one proceeds 
recursively from the claim to validity of such norms and asks what conditions must be 
fulfilled in order to redeem it, the criteria of validity of reciprocity and generality 
become transformed into criteria of discursive justification. It follows that, in justifying 
or challenging a moral norm (or a mode of action), no one can make specific claims 
that he denies to others (reciprocity of contents); moreover no one can simply 
assume that others share his own perspective, evaluations, convictions, interests, or 
needs (reciprocity of reasons), such that one would claim, for instance, to speak in 
the “real” interest of others or in the name of an absolutely indubitable truth beyond 
the reach of justification. And finally it follows that no affected person may be 
prevented from raising objections, and that the reasons that are supposed to 
legitimize a norm must be such that they can be shared by all persons (generality).  
15 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor, Cambridge 1997, p. 46. 
16 For a more detailed discussion see Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification, New York 2011, especially Part I.  
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  In contexts in which what is at stake is safeguarding and recognizing the basic 
status of justifying beings in the political world, therefore, all fundamental claims on 
others must be justified in accordance with these same criteria. This results in the 
possibility of a “moral construction” of certain human rights, namely those which 
could not be denied to others without violating reciprocity and generality.
17
  Thus, on a second level, in addition to the moral constructivism which is 
abstract in nature, a more contextualized, discursive “political constructivism” must be 
conceived which determines the basic rights and claims that should hold in a 
concrete legal community, always under the proviso that all those who are at risk of 
suffering disadvantage or discrimination have a reciprocal right of veto. In this way 
the abstract list of human rights can be embodied in concrete legal and political form 
as basic rights without sacrificing their essential content, for the right of veto – which, 
politically speaking, must of course be institutionalized – ensures that this essential 
content remains intact. The political and moral stimulus for this conception of dignity 
is provided by a critique of social power, and this was always also the original 
inspiration for talk of “human dignity” and “human rights.”  
 Such 
constructions single out a core set of rights, in particular concerning the protection of 
personality, political participation, and material security; but prior to these is the right 
not to be disregarded whenever it is a question of defining and securing such rights. 
Once again it becomes apparent that the moral core of human dignity has political 
relevance. The underlying basic right to justification leads not only to substantive 
basic rights, but first of all to guarantees of participation in the processes in which 
such basic rights are formulated and justified. In this sense the right to justification 
excludes paternalistic stipulations and denials of rights.  
 
5. Against this background, power must be regarded primarily as a discursive 
phenomenon, indeed, however apparently paradoxically, as a noumenal 
phenomenon.
18
                                                            
17 See Rainer Forst, “The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification. A Reflexive 
Approach,” in Ethics 120 (July, 2010): 711-740 
 It consists, in particular, in the ability to order and influence, to 
occupy, and, in extreme cases, to dominate the space of reasons for others, that is, 
to determine the limits of what can be said and thought and, above all, of what is 
accepted and acceptable, of what is justified. Thus exercising power over others – 
18 See Rainer Forst, “Noumenal Power,” Ms.  
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that is, in very general terms, leading them to have thoughts or to perform actions 
which they would not otherwise have had or have performed – is not primarily a 
matter of strength and competition of wills, but of the convictions or beliefs which 
bring persons or groups into a particular social position and anchor them there. 
Power in general terms does not have a negative connotation, for every space of 
reasons is a space of the “power of justifications.” Power must be constantly 
regenerated in discourse and thus must be continually renewed; if it degenerates into 
domination, i.e. rule without adequate justification, it remains effective only if these 
justifications are accepted, whether through ideology or through fear. Thus a critique 
of power ultimately involves problematizing the existing space of reasons and 
justifications; it consists in breaking open rigid, encrusted justification narratives and 
reciprocally untenable clusters of reasons. 
  Here it must be kept in mind that power relations are not uniform but rest on 
pluralistic and tension-laden justifications that allow for and, if necessary, provoke 
contradiction (and “counterpower”). Power is situated within a dynamic field of 
justifications. The transitions to forms of rule (Herrschaft) – to sketch a heuristic 
typology – occur when (religious, traditional, metaphysical, economic, political, etc.) 
justifications become consolidated into hierarchical systems of thought and action 
(irrespective of whether the rule in question is legitimate or illegitimate); domination 
(Beherrschung) arises where the closure of the space of justifications permits 
scarcely any alternatives (whether on account of discursive hegemony or of effective 
threats) and the right to justification is restricted; the transition to violence occurs 
when claims to justification are completely rejected and replaced by other means of 
regulating action. Insofar as this is experienced as “naked violence,” of course, the 
power of the agent resting on recognition dwindles and is reduced to pure physical 
facticity. Power is an expression of a binding of others through reasons; it collapses, 
together with the authority on which it is founded, when it no longer rests on 
acceptance. Whether this marks the end of subjection is a different matter. 
  The concept of ideology can be reformulated against this background. 
Ideologies are justifications of relations of rule or domination that insulate themselves 
from critical challenge by distorting the space of reasons and presenting relations of 
rule or domination as “natural” (unalterable), “God-given,” or in some other way 
falsely, as sufficiently justified. Thus they absolve those in power from the effort of 
justification and offer power-ful explanations that prevent criticism from arising. The  
 
10 
 
analysis of “ideological delusion” does not require any problematic concept of 
“genuine interests” but instead an understanding of the validity claim to reciprocal 
justification whose satisfaction is thwarted. 
 
6. The idea of the dignity of the human being as a being equipped with the right to 
justification makes it possible to address and defuse the objection that the central 
conception of moral autonomy involved is a purely “western,” non-universalizable one 
– a specific aspect of the general problem of cultural immanence versus critical 
transcendence. 
  First we must bear in mind the difference between ethical and moral 
autonomy. Respecting human dignity means not denying anybody’s moral right to 
justification; but it does not imply that only the life that is “autonomously chosen” 
(whatever this may mean in concrete terms) is the “good” life. In purely conceptual 
terms, a life free from demeaning paternalism or domination is one thing, the good 
life something else. Thus the argument presented thus far does not involve any 
specific conception of ethical forms of life or any assertion concerning the good life. 
Ideological narratives, for instance, may exert their power by means of specific 
conceptions and realizations of what counts as the “good life.” Critique of such 
narratives can take the form of ethical criticism, but they should be criticized 
essentially on the grounds that they restrict the justification authority of individuals or 
particular groups. 
  Second, the formal pragmatic grounding of the right to justification briefly 
mentioned above can be supplemented by an immanent grounding.
19
                                                            
19 For a more detailed account see Forst, The Right to Justification, ibid., Ch. 9. 
 For, assuming 
that someone were to defend the integrity of his own (let us assume roughly) “non-
Western” culture against such “alien” moral conceptions, what would he say? He 
would appeal to the integrity of his culture as an integral cultural unity, and such an 
understanding of integrity and integrality would include the assumption that this 
integration is not maintained by force but implies internal acceptance. This would 
presuppose, in turn, that nobody would be systematically prevented from adopting a 
critical stance on this culture and from demanding a right to justification and 
participation. Such a claim would therefore appeal to this society’s own self-
understanding; it would be a form of immanent critique. Thus it becomes apparent 
that justified social and political structures can very well assume extremely diverse  
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forms and that the project of the political is to discover such forms. However, it also 
becomes apparent that, notwithstanding this whole wealth of forms, the basic right to 
justification, and hence a core of basic rights, are indispensable presuppositions for 
talk of integration, unity, etc., not to mention justice. 
 
7. Up to this point I have discussed the right to justification primarily from the 
perspective of moral philosophy and in terms of political history. However, a critical 
theory of social relations calls for a systematic analysis of the practices of justification 
within a society. Societies should be regarded as orders of justification in several 
respects. Historically speaking, social institutions rest on certain justification 
narratives that may in turn be plural in character and provide scope for immanent 
criticism; sociologically speaking, in any given society there is a plurality of normative 
spheres in which particular values or expectations concerning justification hold sway 
– for instance, the spheres of the market, of the family, of education, and of politics – 
and which can be analyzed as spheres of the good or as contexts of recognition or 
justification.
20
  From the perspective of political theory, to be sure, a reflexive institutional 
framework is required whose task is to channel such conflicts and facilitate their 
solution, namely the political system as a system which generates binding decisions, 
presupposing that democratic practices of justification have been sufficiently 
institutionalized, in combination with a discursive public sphere. In this system, 
criticism can find expression not only with regard to certain social spheres; it can also 
refer to the conditions of political justification as such. It then assumes the guise of a 
critique of relations of justification.
 Then criticism becomes possible in the form of identifying and 
condemning infringements of certain limits between spheres; but these spheres are 
also internally by no means normatively homogeneous. Opinions diverge within a 
given society over the functions of the market or the family and the values they 
should embody.  
21
                                                            
20 On the former see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, New York 1983, for the latter see Honneth, Struggle 
for Recognition and Forst, Contexts of Justice; for alternative approaches see Luc Boltanski and Laurent 
Thévenot, On Justification, Princeton 2006, and David Miller, Principles of Social Justice, Cambridge, Mass. 
1999. 
 This not only concerns political relations in the 
narrow sense, however, for social relations and structures in general do not only 
make participation in justification possible or impossible in a relevant sense; they are 
21 On this see Rainer Forst, “First Things First: Redistribution, Recognition and Justification,” in European 
Journal of Political Theory 6 (2007): 291-304.  
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also independent contexts of justification in their own right in which disputes over 
their elaboration are conducted. As I have noted, discursive power
22
  Thus the “critique of relations of justification” has a number of different 
meanings. First, it has the meaning of the critical analysis of non-justifiable political 
and social relations, including those in the economic and cultural dimensions – 
relations of discrimination, of exclusion, of lack of emancipation or of equality of 
opportunity. These involve relations that cannot be legitimized in reciprocal and 
general terms. Second, it means criticism of “false” justifications of such relations that 
insulate them against challenges and represent them as legitimate, ranging from 
metaphysical worldviews to arguments concerning factual or empirical constraints.
 must be 
generated in social-political discourses in order to challenge existing justifications and 
structures of justification; then social space is revealed as a space of reasons and 
also a space of struggles over “justification hegemony” (to put it in Gramscian terms). 
23
 
 
Third, reflexively speaking, it means a critique of the absence of structures and 
institutions of justification themselves that would be necessary in order to facilitate 
the first two categories of criticism and to render them effective. The issue here is to 
expose and rectify the unequal distribution of the resources to generate the “power of 
justification” in both institutional and informal political spaces. The basic claim of 
political and social justice with reference to this process is to establish a “basic 
structure of justification.” 
8. Challenges to provide justifications – specific forms of social criticism – can avail 
themselves of different normative languages. “Ethical” criticism, for instance, relates 
to the quality of existing social conditions in a more or less comprehensive way; it 
operates with evaluative conceptions of the good or successful life which, however 
much they diverge from and unmask the pathologies of received notions concerning 
ways of life, must ultimately be connected back to justification among those affected. 
For in a social universe of justification there is no place outside of this space of 
                                                            
22 In contrast to the communicative conception of power developed by Jürgen Habermas with reference to 
Hannah Arendt in “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power” in Social Research 44/1 (1977): 3-24, 
with which I agree in part, the understanding of discursive power outlined above involves, on the one hand, a 
more pronounced confrontational component – if you will, the force “to” the better argument. On the other hand, 
this understanding of power does not have a direct positive or negative connotation; it merely signifies the 
relations in the social space of justification. 
23 Both the present and the next dimension of the critique of relations of justification prevent “established 
principles” of public justification from imposing narrow limits on what can be cruised. This is a response to an 
objection of Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition,” in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution 
or Recognition?, London 2003, p. 130ff.  
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discursive redemption; in Habermas’s words, in a process of discursive clarification 
there are “only participants.”
24 This does not compel critique to adopt only thin and 
formal concepts, though it is compelled to submit itself to criticism as regards its 
validity. In this way the “moral” form of criticism retains its priority; the central issue is 
which social structures can be demanded in a reciprocal manner. For instance, 
actually overcoming “alienation,” which is the topic of many ethical forms of criticism, 
involves the “appropriation” of the social basic structure by those concerned 
themselves by making it responsive to their demands and subjecting it to their 
democratic control.
25
  In order to be effective, every form of criticism will combine “immanent” with 
“transcending” reasons. When the Levelers demanded a “birthright” to political and 
religious liberty at the time of the English civil war, for instance, they understood by 
this their rights as free English citizens and their “natural” rights; when in addition 
they reinterpreted the social contract establishing a system of rule in bourgeois terms 
as a terminable employment contract, and when they claimed property in themselves 
as God’s will, they combined traditional, revolutionary, bourgeois, and religious 
arguments and recast the fabric of existing justifications into a new narrative which 
they regarded as sufficiently powerful to legitimize the overthrow of a system of 
government.
 
26
  To sum up, structurally speaking, all of these critical languages involve a 
central reflexive idiom, namely that of the dignity of an autonomous being who can 
demand and offer justifications; this is the idiom of justice, which does not in the first 
instance criticize some particular institution or distribution or other but, in a more 
radical way, the entire structure of an order of justification. To quote Horkheimer: 
“That is the universal content of the concept of Justice; according to this concept, the 
social inequality prevailing at any given time requires a rational justification. It ceases 
to be considered as a good, and becomes something that should be overcome.”
 As already mentioned, the alternative between “immanence” and 
“transcendence” is a false one under such historical conditions; both moments were 
necessarily involved in the emancipatory demands of the era. 
27
                                                            
24 Jürgen Habermas, Theorie und Praxis, Frankfurt am Main 1971, p. 45. 
 
25 Here, in my opinion, there is no major difference from the core argument of Rahel Jaeggi, ““Kein Einzelner 
vermag etwas dagegen”: Adornos Minima Moralia als Kritik von Lebensformen,” in A. Honneth (ed.), Dialektik 
der Freiheit, Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 115-41. 
26 For a more detailed discussion see Forst, Toleration in Conflict, ibid., § 15. 
27 Max Horkheimer, “Materialism and Morality,” in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early 
Writings, Cambridge, Mass. 1995, pp. 15-48, here p. 40.  
 
14 
 
The connection between justice and justification is an immanent one: those relations 
are unjust that are not sufficiently justifiable in reciprocal and general terms, and 
those relations are profoundly unjust that systematically thwart the practice of 
justification itself. Putting an end to such relations is the strongest motive of justice 
driving historical struggles; and the word “dignity” features centrally in such struggles. 
They aim to create a social structure in which individuals are able to recognize 
themselves as autonomous in the specifically political sense of being co-creators of 
the institutions that are binding on them. 
 
Translated by Ciaran Cronin
28
                                                            
28 An earlier version of this essay was published as “Der Grund der Kritik. Zum Begriff der Menschenwürde in 
sozialen Rechtfertigungsordnungen”, in Was ist Kritik, ed. Rahel Jaeggi and Tilo Wesche, Frankfurt am Main 
2009, pp. 150-164. 
 